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I. Introduction
A notable trend in recent years has been the swift growth in the intensity of 
firm alliance strategies1 with a consequent proliferation in research studies 
on the subject. Among all the respective topics, one important question has 
merited particular attention from researchers: what motivates firms to enter 
into alliances with other firms? 
The literature reveals a large number of motives for cooperative 
arrangements drawn from several approaches to firm behavior: transaction 
cost theory (Williamson, 1979), resource dependence theory (Barley et al., 
1992), resource-based view (Das and Teng, 2000), organizational learning 
(Kogut, 1988), relationship marketing (Arndt, 1979), strategic behavior 
theory (Kogut, 1988), and so on. Each one of these approaches stresses 
specific aspects of alliance motivation. Transaction cost theory focuses on 
cost minimization, resource dependence theory on getting the resources to 
survive and the resource-based view on synergy. In turn, organizational 
learning rests on knowledge, relationship marketing on providing superior 
customer value and strategic behavior theory on profit maximization. 
Despite the proliferation of motives, the most cited has been the 
desire to reduce transaction costs. Thus, transaction cost economics has
1
 For the purposes of this paper, the expression “firm alliance strategies” designates any 
cooperative arrangement between independent firms that involves a level of integration between
pure market exchange and full internalization, with the establishment (or otherwise) of a separate 
legal entity and the involvement (or otherwise) of minority investments by at least one participant 
firm.
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become the most often mentioned approach in theoretical and empirical 
studies seeking to understand the drivers of alliance formation. Other points 
of view, namely those related to the internal resource situation of the firms 
and their external environment, are not yet so frequently taken into account
as the transactional approach.
In this article, we analyze the impact of firm internal resources and 
perceived environmental uncertainty on the probability of a firm to 
establish an alliance. Thus, our theoretical framework is based on the 
resource dependence and resource-based view approaches, by one side, and 
on the literature about the role of environmental uncertainty on strategic 
alliances, by the other side.
Both the resource dependence theory and the resource-based view 
see firm resource conditions as prime drivers for alliance behavior: the 
probability of a firm entering into an alliance will be a function of the need 
to acquire external resources. However, according to our point of view, the 
first one is more adequate to explain alliances involving resource-poor 
firms while the latter fits better for firms that are relatively well resource-
endowed. Our contribution is to show that results predicted by these two 
approaches should be moderated by perceived environmental uncertainty. 
Specifically, predictions of the resource dependence theory are more likely 
to occur in contexts of high perceived environmental uncertainty while the 
resource-based view fits better when this kind of uncertainty is not very 
high. 
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The departing point of our study is the research made by Park et al
(2002). We take the challenge made by the authors when they suggest that 
future studies should consider managerial perceptions of the environment in 
order to better understand how firms react to environmental changes 
through strategic alliances. Our research and the above cited study have in 
common two basic assumptions: 1) alliance formation as a mechanism to 
adapt to environment is contingent on internal resources, and 2) resource-
poor firms and resource-rich firms can react differently in the same 
environmental context. 
However, our study differs from that of Park et al in a considerable 
number of points: a) the type of uncertainty used to explain the propensity 
of firms to enter into alliances; b) the expected behaviour of firms in 
different environmental contexts; c) the kind of firms included in the 
sample for empirical test purposes; and d) the achieved results. 
Park et al (2002) consider the state of the market (stable, declining 
and growing) objectively measured as the sole environmental factor 
influencing the alliance behaviour of the firms. We don’t question the 
appropriateness of this indicator for the purposes of the study, but the 
market is not the only source of uncertainty for firms. Hence, we followed 
the suggestion made by the authors themselves, and use several measures of 
perceived environmental context, that is, measures that reflect the way 
managers evaluate the external context of their firms. In particular, we aim 
to understand if different levels of perceived environmental uncertainty are 
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associated with different firm behaviours regarding inter-firm alliances. In 
our study, the level of environmental uncertainty is dependent on several 
external factors (subjectively evaluated by managers), including the state of 
the market.
Park et al (2002) hypothesize that resource-rich firms are more likely 
to settle alliances when the market demand declines or grows, suggesting a 
U-shaped relationship between the level of environmental uncertainty and 
the propensity f firms to enter into alliances. They hypothesize also that 
resource-poor firms are more likely to enter into alliances when the market 
demand grows, suggesting a direct and positive relationship between the 
level of environmental uncertainty and the propensity to ally for this kind of 
firms. Based on the resource dependence theory and the resource-based 
view, we argue that the above cited relationship will be negative for the 
resource-rich firms and positive for the resource-poor ones.
In order to empirically test their hypotheses, Park et al (2002) use a 
sample based on a sole industrial sector (semiconductor industry),
recognizing that this is a limitation of their work. Additionally, they only 
consider start-up firms. We considered several industrial sectors as well as 
start-up and non-start-up firms. Hence, our study is more general, although 
recognizing that firm alliance behaviours can change across industries.
Finally, regarding the results, Park et al (2002) conclude that 
resource-rich firms are more active in volatile markets while resource-poor 
firms are more active in relatively stable markets. We conclude that 
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resource rich firms are more prone to settle alliances in relatively 
predictable environmental contexts while resource-poor ones have a higher 
propensity to ally in uncertain environmental contexts. However, these 
differences in the results will be moderated if we take into account that we 
use a different measure for the environmental context.
The paper is structured in two sections, in addition to this 
introduction and the conclusions. In section II, we conceptualize how 
perceived envir nmental uncertainty and resource conditions independently 
affect the propensity of firms to collaborate (model 1). Then, we let 
resource conditions and environmental uncertainty interact in order to 
obtain different resource condition impacts on the probability of firms 
engaging in alliances (model 2). In section III, the two models are 
formalized and applied to our sample in order to obtain a set of probabilities 
for alliance formation. 
II. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
As said above, we agree with Park et al (2002) that alliances can be 
viewed as an adaptive response to changes in the environment. However, 
introducing environmental uncertainty as a key determinant factor of firm 
alliance strategies raises three important questions: 1) what are the sources 
of environmental uncertainty, 2) what type of environmental uncertainty 
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should we be dealing with, and 3) what measures of environmental 
uncertainty (objective or perceived) are most adequate. 
All these questions were already discussed by Milliken (1987), 
whose point of view could be summarized as follows: a) environmental 
uncertainty is a multidimensional concept; b) there are three types of 
environmental uncertainty: state uncertainty, that is, unpredictability of 
particular components of the environment; effect uncertainty, that is, 
unpredictability about the impact on the organization of particular 
environmental events; and response uncertainty, that is, inability to predict 
the consequences of a choice; and c) environmental uncertainty should be 
distinguished as a descriptor of the state of organizational environments, 
that is, as a characteristic of the environment objectively measurably, and as 
a descriptor of the state of a person who perceives himself/herself to be 
lacking critical information about the environment, that is, as a perceptual 
phenomenon.
Based on Milliken’s (1987) classification, we deal with state 
uncertainty and adopt the notion of perceived environmental uncertainty, 
that is, the firms’s perceived inability to predict something accurately. Our 
argument is that environmental uncertainty is perceptual in nature, that is, it 
is not unpredictable change per se that has implications on alliance 
decisions, but the perception of managers about the likelihood of such 
changes. At the same time, we consider that environmental changes have to 
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7
do with three main fields: market, external resources (technology, human 
resources and so on) and competition.
Many researchers have studied the effects of environmental 
uncertainty on firm alliance strategies (Beckman et al, 2004; Burgers et al, 
1993; Dickson and Weaver, 1997; Robertson and Gatignon, 1998; Sarkar et 
al, 2001; Steensma et al, 2000). According to these studies, the general 
conclusion is that firms enter into alliances in order to attain flexibility and 
enable prompt reactions to changes (Child and Faulkner, 1998). The higher 
the level of environmental uncertainty, the greater the need a firm has to 
engage in collaboration with other firms. Thus, following these studies, the 
relationship between this factor and the propensity to alliance formation 
would be positive.
But the decision to ally is also contingent on the internal resource 
situation of the firm. The most adequate theoretical approaches to 
understand the role of resources in alliance formation are the resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
and the resource-based view (Das and Teng, 2000; Dussauge and Garrette, 
1999; Faulkner and De Rond, 2000). Both theories emphasize the internal 
resource situation of the firm as the prime driver for alliance formation. 
However, while the former emphasizes internal resource scarcity and the 
need to survive, the latter puts forward the internal resource capacities and 
the willingness to generate competitive advantages. 
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Specifically, the resource dependence theory argues that some firms 
cannot internally generate all the resources they need. In a resource scarce 
context, the need for acquiring resources generates weaknesses. A fast and 
efficient mechanism to overcome these weaknesses is to establish alliances 
(Park et al, 2002). Thus, cooperation is seen as a result of the desire of 
firms to acquire resources they lack internally but that are necessary for 
their survival. 
Insofar as deficiencies in resources are viewed as driving forces for 
collaboration, alliance strategies are particularly relevant for resource-poor 
firms because they sharply experience resource dependency rather than any 
resource sufficiency (Steensma et al, 2000). If a firm controls all the 
resources it needs, the desire to enter into an alliance will be very low, that 
is, resource shortages foster support for alliances whilst a situation of 
resource self-sufficiency ensures a lesser propensity to collaboration. 
Compared to those resource-rich, resource-poor firms would be more 
motivated to enter into alliances (Burgers et al, 1993) so that the 
relationship between the probability of a firm engaging in an alliance and 
the resources it controls would tend to be negative according to the resource 
dependence theory.
The resource-based view also emphasizes the role of resources to 
explain inter-firm alliance strategies, but puts things in a different way. 
Firms are supposed to be well endowed in resources that they want to 
capitalize on through alliances in order to generate value and reinforce their 
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competitive advantage. The main argument for alliance formation is that 
firms try to leverage their superior resources with complementary resources 
owned by other firms (Stein, 1997). As a result, according to this theory,
resource-rich firms would tend to be more active in creating alliances, 
unless they control all the needed resources.
If we combine the theoretical outcomes of both approaches, the 
result will be undetermined. According to the resource dependence theory, 
the relationship between the propensity to ally and the number of resources 
a firm controls would be negative, but the opposite is expected from the 
resource-based approach. Combining environmental uncertainty and firm 
resources in a model with no interaction (model 1), the hypothesis to be 
tested will be the following:
H1 – The probability of a firm entering into an alliance is directly 
and positively related to the level of environmental uncertainty it perceives 
and depends on the number of resources it controls.
However, our point of view is that this model is not adequate to fully 
explain alliance behavior. The adaptive response of firms to environment is 
conditioned by their internal situations, notably in terms of the resources 
they control, as Park et al (2002) also point out. Our main argument is that 
if we want to make full use of the explanatory power of both approaches 
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10
(resource dependence and resource-based views), we have to allow 
interaction between resource conditions and environmental uncertainty. The 
strong propensity of resource-rich (resource-poor) firms to engage in 
alliances predicted by the resource-based view (resource dependence 
theory) may be moderated by perceived environmental conditions, 
according to our line of reasoning. Therefore, a more complex explanation 
is needed and other hypotheses have to be tested in order to understand the 
role that resources and perceived environmental uncertainty interactively 
play in alliance formation (model 2).
Resources obtained through alliances help firms to overcome 
resource shortages or to take the most from market opportunities. Resource 
shortages are particularly pressing in uncertain environmental contexts and 
market opportunities tend to arise more frequently in stable environmental 
contexts. So, external situation determines the kind of alliance that is more 
probable to occur: an alliance to fill a resource gap or an alliance to enhance 
a resource advantage. Hence, external situation determines also the kind of 
firms that set alliances with a higher probability: resource-poor or resource-
rich firms, respectively.
The use of the concepts of “exploitation alliance” and “exploration 
alliance” is useful at this point. Park et al (2002) define an “exploitation 
alliance” as a pull-oriented alliance, that is, “a need-based alliance to 
sustain a firm’s survival”, and an “exploration alliance” as a push-oriented 
alliance, that is, an alliance “to create new opportunities”. The first type of 
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alliance tends to occur more frequently in contexts of high environmental 
uncertainty, when survival is the main objective of firms. When
environmental uncertainty is not so high, this kind of alliances has a lower 
probability to arise because firms are more interested in taking advantage 
from the environment and the need to survive is less pressing. Alliances of 
the latter type, that is, “exploration alliances” are then more frequent. This 
is to say that the environmental context tends to determine the nature of the 
alliance.
Hence, environmental uncertainty determines also the type of firm 
more prone to settle alliances. Resource gaps and the need to survive are 
more frequent for resource-poor firms. As a consequence, resource-poor 
firms tend to engage more in alliances when environmental uncertainty is 
high (alliances enhance the short-term viability of these kind of firms) and 
less in relatively stable contexts. This is in accordance with the resource 
dependence theory. So, the hypothesis to test will be,
H2 – The probability of a firm entering into an alliance is negatively 
related to the number of resources it controls when the level of 
environmental uncertainty it perceives is high.
Resource advantages and the capability to take advantage from new 
opportunities characterize better resource-rich firms. This situation can not 
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12
be well understood using the resource dependence theory. In order to 
capture windows of opportunity, firms must be strong in internal resources, 
that is, they must be resource-rich, as postulated by the resource-based 
approach. Empirical results also support the view that these firms are more 
able to diversify products and activities (Gourlay and Seaton, 2004), 
creating new chances to ally. 
Environmental opportunities are more probable to arise when 
uncertainty is n t very high. As stated by Park et al (2002), “in a declining 
market, firms [that is, resource-rich firms] refrain from expanding or 
acquiring new resources, which further reduces opportunities for inter-firm 
collaboration”. Following Park & Russo (1996), they argue that “any 
potential benefits of alliances would be offset by high costs and risks 
involved in setting up and managing strategic alliances”. Hence, 
H3 – The probability of a firm entering into an alliance is positively 
related to the number of resources it controls when the level of 
environmental uncertainty it perceives is low.
Summing up, the resource based view and the resource dependence 
theory have a strong explanation power for the behaviour of firms regarding 
strategic alliances. However, we contest the possibility of each one of these 
approaches being tested with models that do not allow for the interaction 
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between the level of environmental uncertainty and the number of resources 
firms control. Regarding the resource dependence theory, what is surprising 
is that albeit the importance that resources and uncertainty separately play 
in the framework, they do not act interactively to explain alliances. If they 
do, theoretical results would be somewhat different.
Thus, the conclusions of our integrative model support both the 
resource dependence theory and the resource-based view (table 1). The 
probability of a firm establishing an alliance rises when the number of 
resources it controls increases if perceived environmental uncertainty is not 
a serious constraint (the resource-based view). Otherwise, we have an 
inverse relationship (resource dependence theory).
[Insert Table 1. about here]
III. Data, econometric models and results
The data used in our models were collected through a survey made to a 
sample of Portuguese firms. The set of firms to be surveyed was selected 
from an official database (Base Belém) published by the Portuguese 
Statistical Institute (INE), containing the largest 10.000 Portuguese firms. 
In order to select the firms to be inquired, we used as criteria the sub-sector 
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of activity and the size of the firm. Concretely, we selected only firms 
belonging to 29 industrial sub-sectors and, within each sub-sector, the 50% 
largest ones. The number of firms enquired was 2751 and the number of 
respondent firms with complete data for estimation purposes was 310, of 
which 83 correspond to effective alliances.
The survey was put in place at the end of 1999 and was directed to 
the CEOs of the firms. Questions included the following categories: a) 
general information (sector of activity, size of the firm, year of 
establishment, R&D activities, level of internationalization); b) evaluation 
of the environmental context (market, technology and competition 
constraints); c) establishment of alliances with other firms during 1995-
1999 and data related to them (main objective, number and nationality of 
partners, type of alliance).
In cases with no alliance, all data are for 1997. For firms with only 
one alliance created in the period 1995-1999, the data are for the year of the 
alliance. When two or more alliances were created in this period, we asked 
the CEOs to consider only the first one and to report all the relevant data for 
the year of the establishment of this alliance.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the 
explanatory variables used in the econometric analysis.
[Insert table 2 about here]
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The probability of alliance formation is modeled as:
Model 1:
[ ] ( , , , , )P alliance f AGE SIZE EFF PEU NRES=
Model 2:
[ ] 2 2( , , , , , , , )P alliance g AGE SIZE EFF PEU NRES PEU NRES PEU NRES= ×
 
where PEU (perceived environmental uncertainty) and NRES (number of 
resources the focal firm controls) are the main variables, and AGE (age of 
the focal firm, in years), SIZE (size of the focal firm measured by number 
of employees), and EFF (efficiency of the focal firm measured by the ratio 
sales turnover / number of employees) are control variables. In both cases, a 
logit specification was adopted. 
Before presenting the results of the two models, a more accurate 
explanation and justification of the independent variables are needed.
As regards PEU, we have taken into account that our sample mainly 
includes SMEs, though they are among the biggest Portuguese firms. 
Although this kind of firm may be just as sensitive to many types of 
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uncertainty as any other company, we expect their engagement in alliances 
to be especially sensitive to particular sources of uncertainty. So and 
following Burgers et al (1993), Dickson and Weaver (1997) and Sarkar et 
al (2001), we have considered technology, market and competition 
constraints as relevant sources of uncertainty for our sample of firms. 
Technological complexity and volatility and increasing technological 
development costs threaten the relevance of existing competencies making 
alliances a source of advantages in the process of getting new technological 
knowledge. In the same way, demand uncertainty has been found to 
influence investment (Caselli et al, 2003; Price, 1996). In turbulent markets 
where customer needs evolve rapidly, collaboration helps firms to develop 
new products and services that satisfy emerging consumer needs and 
enhances their capacity to enter new markets and segments. As regards
competition constraints, in rapidly changing competitive environments 
firms never know in advance whether or not their actions will invite 
retaliation or which moves by competitive rivals will bear a direct impact 
upon them (Burgers et al, 1993). In this situation, firms can improve their 
positions by creating new networks with new partners or maintain them by 
reinforcing existing relationships through additional alliances in order to 
increase entry barriers and reduce the level of competitive intensity (Sarkar 
et al, 2001). 
Therefore, and in order to test the influence of environmental 
constraints on the propensity of firms to engage into alliances, we have used 
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a composed variable including items related to technology, demand and 
competition indicators. Each of these three items was expressed in a five-
point response scale in order to assess manager perception of environmental 
constraints. Specifically, we asked CEOs to respond to what extent 1) the 
pace and complexity of contemporary technological developments, 2) 
consumer behavior and 3) the behavior of competitors, are constraining 
factors in the development of firm strategy. Then, for each firm we have 
calculated the simple average of the three results, thus obtaining a scale of
1 to 5 for our composite variable. 
In order to evaluate the extent to which resources controlled by the 
firm are important for engagement in alliance strategies, we have 
considered five critical resources: the existence of R&D activities in the 
focal firm, access to technology and general know-how, experience in 
internationalization processes, access to financial resources and access to a 
specialized work-force. The first item was objectively measured (the firm 
develops or not R&D activities) and for the latter four we have used five-
point scale perceived measures. For each of these latter four items, we 
calculated the simple average of all responses at the sector level, in order to 
take into consideration sectoral specificities. Accordingly, we considered as 
weak those cases with worst situations than the sector average and as strong 
all other cases. The variable measuring resource strength was then 
graduated from 0 (the focal firm is weak in all items) to 5 (the focal firm is 
strong in all items). 
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While our explanatory variable NRES measures internal resources, 
the variable PEU is linked to external conditions. As we can see in table 2, 
the correlation coefficient between these two variables is negative and equal 
to -0.32.
The choice of control variables (AGE, SIZE and EFF) aims to 
incorporate into the models the variables most often used in other studies2. 
We do not expect specific results for these variables because the extant 
literature is not consensual in this field.
Summing up, the two models differ, not in their original explanatory 
variables (exactly the same in both models) but in the way they combine to 
produce results and test hypotheses. In model 1, no interaction between 
independent variables is assumed. In model 2, we let perceived 
environmental uncertainty and the number of resources interact and we 
admit a non-linear relationship between the probability of alliance 
formation and each of these independent variables. 
Our expectation is that model 1 will produce increasing probabilities 
of alliance formation with the increase of PEU (hypothesis H1). As regards 
model 2, and having in mind H2 and H3, our expectation is that the 
probability of alliance formation will increase with the rise in PEU (NRES) 
for low levels of NRES (PEU) and decreases with PEU (NRES) for high 
levels of NRES (PEU).
2
 See, for example, Bishop (2003), Gomes-Casseres (1997), Rothweel (1983), Moenaert et al
(1990), Steensma et al (2000), Foster and Meinhard (2002), Baum and Oliver (1991), Stuart et al
(1999), Levitt and March (1988), Burgers et al (1993), Park et al (2002).
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Results of model 1 support H1 (table 3). The coefficient of PEU is 
positive and statistically significant. Regarding the variable NRES we see 
that the coefficient is also positive and statistically significant. This means 
that the probability of a firm entering into an alliance increases with the 
level of environmental uncertainty it perceives and the number of resources 
it controls. 
The probability of alliance formation for all levels of PEU and NRES
can be calculated using the results of model 1 (table 4). With a level 1 of 
perceived environmental uncertainty, the probability of a firm entering into 
an alliance when it controls none of the included resources is 1.45%. The 
probability rises to 88.9% when we consider a firm that controls all the five 
resources considered and has a level 5 of perceived environmental 
uncertainty. 
In general, the results are in accordance with the predictions of the 
resource-based view, independent of the level of perceived environmental 
uncertainty. However, we can see that low levels of environmental 
uncertainty produce lower probabilities of alliance formation, regardless of 
the number of resources the firm controls. This already serves as a first 
indication that environmental conditions matter in the behavior of firms.
[Insert Table 3. about here]
[Insert Table 4. about here]
[Insert Table 5. about here]
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Results of model 2 also corroborate our expectations (table 3). All 
the estimated coefficients for the main variables are statistically significant. 
In particular, we obtained negative estimates for the coefficients of PEU-
squared and NRES-squared, indicating an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the probability of alliance formation and the level of perceived 
environmental uncertainty, on the one hand, and this probability and the 
number of resources, on the other. This means that alliance events seem to 
be more common for conjointly intermediate values of these variables than 
for the conjointly extreme values. The interaction term is also significant 
indicating strong crossed effects of the two explanatory variables on the 
probabilities of alliance formation.
Both in models 1 and 2, the high value of the likelihood ratio (LR) 
rejects the hypothesis of joint exclusion of all the explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, the joint exclusion of the additional variables in model 2 is 
clearly rejected by the data (the value of the LR test statistic is 27.0, quite 
above the critical value of 7.81 corresponding to a 2(3;0.05) ), thus giving a 
clear preference for this model when we confront it with model 1.
The estimated probabilities (table 5) show that for the first three 
levels of perceived environmental uncertainty, the probability of alliance 
formation increases with the number of resources in accordance with the 
resource-based view. Conversely, for the highest levels of that variable, the 
probability of an alliance event tends to decrease with the number of 
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resources controlled by the firm. Thus, as expected, the resource-based 
view holds for low levels of environmental uncertainty and the resource 
dependence theory can be applied when firms face sharply adverse external 
conditions.
IV. Conclusions
The resource dependence theory and the resource-based view both 
emphasize the role of internal resource conditions on inter-firm alliance 
formation. The first on  is more appropriate to explain cooperation 
involving resource-poor firms while the latter is more adequate to 
understand alliances between resource-rich ones. The main contribution of 
this article is to show that these results are contingent on environmental 
uncertainty perceived by firms. So, we let resource conditions and 
perceived environmental uncertainty interact in order to fully assess their 
impact on the probability of firms to engage in alliances.
We have argued that for high levels of perceived environmental 
uncertainty, resource-rich firms are not predisposed to collaborate because 
the costs of collaboration are greater than the potential benefits. Despite of
also suffering from high collaboration costs, resource-poor firms have no 
viable alternative and prefer to support the costs of collaboration rather than 
perish. Hence, volatile environmental conditions are more prone for the 
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establishment of alliances involving resource-poor firms than that involving 
resource-rich ones.
Even if environmental conditions are not particularly constraining,
firms may still experience a high desire to collaborate. However, the 
resource-poor encounter difficulty in finding potential partners because they 
have no relevant resources to share. This makes the cost of collaboration 
very high because partners can impose unacceptable conditions in a context 
where the survival of the firm is not threatened. These firms then show a 
low propensity to ally. On the contrary, resource-rich firms are interesting 
partners in a context where the benefits of allying exceed the costs. 
Therefore, for low levels of environmental uncertainty, alliances are mainly 
developed by this kind of firms and “exploration” alliances are particularly 
relevant in this context.
Our empirical results support the theoretical arguments. Confronting 
the estimates obtained with models 1 and 2, the data give a clear preference 
to the model with interaction between resources and environmental 
uncertainty. That is, the impact of resources on alliance activity is 
moderated by perceived uncertainty. In fact, table 5 shows that, for high 
levels of environmental uncertainty, the probability of alliance formation 
tends to be negatively related to the number of resources a firm controls, a 
result that is in accordance with our hypothesis H2. For low levels of 
uncertainty, the probability of alliances increases with the number of 
resources, in line with our hypothesis H3. 
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These results contrast with those of Park et al (2002), although they
work with a different concept of uncertainty and use only star-up firms in 
the semiconductor industry. In our case, we used data concerning 29 
industrial sub-sectors. Sectoral specificities are partially taken into account 
by the way we defined the resources variable. It would be interesting to 
further differentiate between sectors and also particular types of alliances. 
However, the limited number of alliances in our database does not allow us 
to exploit this type of analysis.
So, the main conclusion of this paper is that the resource-based view 
holds for low levels of perceived environmental uncertainty whilst the 
resource dependence theory fits better to severe adverse conditions. Our 
interpretation is that, in the first case, alliances are mainly explained by the 
capacity to find partners, that is, by the availability of internal resources. In 
the second case, they are activated by a lack of resources and the fear of 
bankruptcy within a context of great environmental uncertainty.
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Table 1. Probabilities of alliance formation
Number of resources
Low High
Approach
Low LOW HIGH Resource-based viewLevel of 
environmental 
uncertainty
High HIGH LOW Resource dependence theory
Table 2. Mean values, standard deviations and 
correlation matrix for the explanatory 
variables in models 1 and 2
Mean Std Dev    Correlation coefficient
AGE SIZE EFF PEU NRES
AGE 29.4 24.0 1.00
SIZE 391 1417 -0.09 1.00
EFF 21.7 60.9 -0.05 0.03 1.00
PEU 3.04 0.73 0.01 -0.16 0.03 1.00
NRES 2.31 1.32 0.02 0.18 0.14 -0.32 1.00
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Table 3. Econometric results
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coefficient Standard-
error
p-value Coefficient Standard-
error
p-value
Constant -6.289 .9763 .000 -29.95 6.488 .000
AGE .0191 .0056 .001 .0210 .0063 .001
SIZE .00037 .00019 .050 .00051 .00026 .053
EFF .00002 .000008 .013 .000015 .000009 .097
PEU .9161 .2308 .000 10.39 2.848 .000
NRES .5282 .1298 .000 6.705 1.557 .000
PEU2 -.8456 .3340 .011
NRES2 -.2493 .1092 .022
PEU*NRES -1.465 .3331 .000
N 310 310
Log-likelihood -145.3 -131.8
LR 69.6 96.65
% of correct
 predictions 77.7 78.7
Table 4. Probabilities of alliance formation – model 1
Number of resources
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.0145 0.0243 0.0405 0.0669 0.108 0.171
2 0.0354 0.0586 0.0955 0.152 0.233 0.340
3 0.0841 0.135 0.209 0.309 0.432 0.563
4 0.187 0.280 0.398 0.528 0.655 0.763Pe
rc
ei
v
ed
 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
ta
l 
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
5 0.364 0.493 0.623 0.737 0.826 0.889
Estimates based on mean values for the control variables
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Table 5. Probabilities of alliance formation – model 2
Number of resources
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0031 .0915 .6680
2 .0000 .0004 .0077 .0882 .4240 .7730
3 .0052 .0393 .1630 .3610 .4980 .5140
4 .3120 .4510 .4750 .3770 .1970 .0572Pe
rc
ei
v
ed
 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
ta
l 
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
5 .8790 .7530 .4370 .1070 .0111 .0006
Estimates based on mean values for the control variables
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